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Abstract
Vehicle-to-grid increases the low utilization rate of privately owned electric vehicles by mak-
ing their batteries available to the electricity grid. We formulate a robust optimization problem
in continuous time that maximizes the expected profit from selling primary frequency regula-
tion to the grid and guarantees that vehicle owners can meet their market commitments for all
frequency deviation trajectories in an uncertainty set that encodes applicable EU legislation.
Faithfully modeling the energy conversion losses during battery charging and discharging ren-
ders this optimization problem non-convex. By exploiting a total unimodularity property of
the proposed uncertainty sets and an exact linear decision rule reformulation, we prove that
this non-convex robust optimization problem in continuous time is equivalent to a tractable lin-
ear program. Through extensive numerical experiments based on real-world data we investigate
how the value of vehicle-to-grid depends on the penalties for non-delivery of promised regulation
power, the delivery guarantees, and the vehicle’s battery, charger, and yearly mileage.
Keywords: Vehicle-to-Grid, Frequency Regulation, Energy Storage, Energy Economics,
Robust Optimization, Continuous-Time Linear Programming.
1 Introduction
Replacing internal combustion engine vehicles with electric vehicles reduces urban air pollution and
mitigates climate change if electricity is generated from renewable sources (Sperling, 1994). In
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general, privately owned vehicles are a vastly underutilized resource. Vehicle usage data collected
by the US Federal Highway Administration (2017) shows that on an average day over 90% of all
privately owned vehicles are parked at any one time—even during peak rush hour. Since electricity
grids require storage capacity to integrate increasing amounts of intermittent wind and solar power,
electric vehicle owners could capitalize on their batteries by offering storage to the electricity grid
when their vehicles are parked. Kempton and Letendre (1997) term this idea vehicle-to-grid.
Réseau de transport d’électricité (RTE), Europe’s largest transmission system operator, ex-
pects to need an additional flexible generation and electricity storage capacity of 10GW to 20GW
by 2035. This corresponds to 7.5% to 15% of the total French electricity generation capacity in
2017 (RTE 2017b; 2017c). If electric vehicles were to provide some of this flexibility, then the
vehicles and the electricity grid could share the costs of electric vehicle batteries. Kempton and
Tomić (2005) and Noel et al. (2019) have identified primary frequency regulation1 as one of the
most profitable flexibility services for vehicle-to-grid. Electric vehicles that provide this service
must maintain a continuous power flow to the vehicle battery that is proportional to the deviation
of the instantaneous grid frequency from its nominal value (i.e., 50Hz in Europe). As primary
frequency regulation is the first flexibility service used to stabilize the electricity network after dis-
turbances (Rebours et al., 2007), its provision must be highly reliable. However, RTE questions the
reliability of vehicle-to-grid (RTE 2017b). The European Commission (2017) has recently addressed
this concern by defining a minimum level of reliability that electric vehicles and other providers of
frequency regulation must guarantee. Specifically, it demands that providers must be able to deliver
regulation power for all frequency deviation trajectories with certain characteristics.
Adopting the perspective of a vehicle owner, we formulate an optimization model for determin-
ing the bidding strategy on the regulation market that maximizes the expected profit from selling
primary frequency regulation to the transmission system operator under the reliability constraints
imposed by the European Commission. These constraints must hold robustly for all frequency
deviation trajectories in an uncertainty set consistent with applicable legislation. As these trajec-
tories constitute continuous-time functions, we are confronted with a robust optimization problem
in continuous time. Moreover, the impossibility of simultaneously charging and discharging the
battery—which amounts to dissipating energy through conversion losses and could be profitable
1Primary frequency regulation is also known as primary frequency control and as frequency containment reserves.
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when the battery is full and there is a reward for down-regulation (see, e.g., (Taylor, 2015, p. 84))—
renders the optimization problem non-convex. The main theoretical contribution of this paper is to
show that the resulting non-convex robust optimization problem in continuous time is equivalent to
a tractable linear program. Specifically, this paper makes the following methodological contributions
to the literature on robust optimization (see Ben-Tal et al. (2009) for a textbook introduction).
• We introduce new uncertainty sets in function spaces that capture those frequency deviation
trajectories for which regulation providers must be able to deliver all promised regulation
power. These uncertainty sets are reminiscent of the budget uncertainty sets by Bertsimas and
Sim (2004) in finite-dimensional spaces, and their construction is inspired by EU legislation.
• By leveraging a total unimodularity property of the proposed uncertainty sets and an exact
linear decision rule reformulation, we prove that the worst-case frequency deviation scenarios
in all (convex or non-convex) robust constraints of the vehicle owner’s optimization problem
can be found by solving continuous linear programs, which can be viewed as variants of the
so-called separated continuous linear programs introduced by Anderson et al. (1983).
• By demonstrating that all these continuous linear programs are solved by piecewise constant
frequency deviation trajectories, we show that the vehicle owner’s robust optimization problem
in continuous time is equivalent to a robust optimization problem in discrete time. In doing
so, we use more direct proof techniques than Pullan (1995), who derived sufficient conditions
under which the solutions of separated continuous linear programs are piecewise constant.
• The robust optimization problem obtained by time discretization is still non-convex. Using
the structural properties of its (discretized) uncertainty sets and of its objective and constraint
functions, however, we can prove that it is equivalent to a linear robust optimization problem
that can be reformulated as a tractable linear program via standard techniques.
To our best knowledge, robust optimization models with uncertainty sets embedded in function
spaces have so far only been considered in the context of robust control, where the primary goal is to
develop algorithms for evaluating conservative approximations (Houska, 2011). In contrast, we study
here a robust optimization problem in continuous time that admits a lossless time discretization
and can, despite its non-convexity, be reformulated exactly as a tractable linear program.
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As this linear program is amenable to efficient numerical solution, we are able to perform ex-
tensive numerical experiments based on real-world data pertaining to the French electricity system.
We define the value of vehicle-to-grid as the profit from selling primary frequency regulation relative
to a baseline scenario in which the vehicle owner does not offer grid services. The main practical
contribution of this paper is to show how the value of vehicle-to-grid depends on the penalties for
non-delivery of promised regulation power, the size of the uncertainty set, and the vehicle’s battery,
charger, and mileage. We thus contribute to the growing literature on the impact of contract pa-
rameters on electricity storage (Broneske and Wozabal, 2017; Sunar and Birge, 2019). The main
insights drawn from our computational experiments can be summarized as follows.
• Based on 2016–2019 data, we show that the value of vehicle-to-grid attainable with a bidding
strategy that is guaranteed to satisfy all reliability requirements is around 100e per year.
Earlier studies based on anticipative bidding strategies that may violate the legal requirements
in practice have estimated this value to be four times higher (Codani et al., 2015; Borne, 2019).
• We find a similar value of vehicle-to-grid as (Codani et al., 2015; Borne, 2019) if the vehicle
owner risks financial penalties for ignoring the legal reliability requirements. This suggests
that current penalties are too low to incentivize vehicle owners to respect the law.
• The value of vehicle-to-grid peaks at a yearly mileage of about 104km and 3·104km for a vehicle
with a bidirectional and a unidirectional charger, respectively, and the maximum attainable
with a bidirectional charger is about four times higher than with a unidirectional charger.
Beyond vehicle-to-grid, this paper contributes to the literature on the optimal usage of energy
storage assets. The value of a storage asset is usually identified with the profit that can be generated
through arbitrage by trading the stored commodity on spot or forward markets. If trading is re-
stricted to the spot market and prices are Markovian, it is known that the asset’s value is maximized
by a basestock policy (Secomandi, 2010). If the commodity is also traded on forward markets, then
the high dimensional models of forward curve evolution lead to intractable Markov decision processes
that can be addressed with approximate dynamic programming methods (Nadarajah et al., 2015).
For systems of interconnected storage assets with large capacities such as hydroelectric reservoirs,
medium-term planning over several months or years is necessary. The resulting optimization prob-
lems are traditionally addressed with stochastic dynamic programming (Yeh, 1985) or stochastic
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dual dynamic programming (Pereira and Pinto, 1991). Alternatively, Pritchard et al. (2005) use a
two-layer dynamic programming method to optimize the participation of a hydroelectric reservoir
in a spot market, where the inner layer maximizes the expected revenues over a stage, which com-
prises several trading intervals, for a fixed mean and variance of water release over the stage, while
the outer layer optimizes the mean and variance of water release over the stages. More recently,
Löhndorf et al. (2013) combine ideas from stochastic dual dynamic programming and approximate
dynamic programming for optimizing the forward trading decisions of hydro storage systems.
Unlike traditional centralized storage assets, decentralized storage assets such as electric vehi-
cles are usually connected to distribution rather than transmission grids. This means that they
face retail and not wholesale electricity prices. While wholesale prices are determined by market
mechanisms and thus stochastic, retail prices are often regulated and thus deterministic. Another
major difference is that it may take several days to fully charge or discharge centralized storage
assets such as hydropower plants, whereas the batteries of electric vehicles can be fully charged and
discharged in just a few hours. A daily planning horizon is therefore sufficient for optimizing their
usage. In addition, typical vehicle owners can anticipate their driving needs at most one day in
advance. One can thus solve the storage management problem in a receding horizon fashion.
The state-of-charge of a vehicle battery depends non-linearly on the power in- and outflows,
which leads to non-convex optimization models. If the battery is merely used for arbitrage and
market prices are non-negative, then these optimization models admit exact convex relaxations.
Conversely, if the battery is used for frequency regulation or if market prices can fall below zero, then
a non-convex constraint is needed to prevent the models from dissipating energy by simultaneously
charging and discharging the battery (Zhou et al., 2016). If energy conversion losses are negligible
and the battery state-of-charge is thus linear in the power flows, then one can model the provision
of frequency regulation through adjustable uncertainty sets. Such an approach has been proposed
by Zhang et al. (2017) for frequency regulation with building appliances. A stochastic dynamic
programming scheme for optimizing the charging and discharging policy of an electric vehicle with
linear battery dynamics is proposed by Donadee and Ilić (2014). If energy conversion losses are
significant, however, one may still approximate the state-of-charge by a linear decision rule of the
uncertain frequency deviations (Warrington et al., 2013). Sortomme and El-Sharkawi (2012) study
a similar model under the assumption of perfect foresight.
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In practice, several hundreds or thousands of electric vehicles must be aggregated to be able to
bid enough reserve power to qualify for participation in the frequency regulation market. Guille and
Gross (2009), Han et al. (2010), Wenzel et al. (2018) and Zhang et al. (2020) develop frameworks for
controlling the batteries of aggregated vehicles, while the design of contracts between aggregators
and vehicle owners is examined by Han et al. (2011) and Broneske and Wozabal (2017). The policy
implications for the market entry of electric vehicle aggregators are investigated by Borne et al.
(2018). Yet the study of vehicle-to-grid schemes for individual vehicles remains relevant because
they constitute important building blocks for aggregation schemes and because they still pose many
challenges—especially when it comes to faithfully modeling all major sources of uncertainty.
The model developed in this paper is most closely related to the discrete-time robust optimization
models by Yao et al. (2017) and Namor et al. (2019), which capture the uncertainty of the frequency
deviations through simplicial uncertainty sets that cover all empirical frequency deviation scenarios.
However, these uncertainty sets may fail to include unseen future frequency deviation scenarios and
are inconsistent with applicable EU legislation. While Yao et al. (2017) disregard energy conversion
losses, Namor et al. (2019) account for them heuristically and test the resulting charging and
discharging policies experimentally on a real battery. Heuristics are also common in pilot projects
that demonstrate the use of vehicle-to-grid for frequency regulation (Vandael et al., 2013, 2020).
The model proposed in this paper relies on three simplifying assumptions that we justify below.
Our first key assumption is that the provision of frequency regulation has no negative impact on
battery lifetime—even though the fear of battery degradation has been identified as a major obstacle
to the widespread adoption of vehicle-to-grid (Lauinger et al., 2017). To justify this assumption, we
point out that the impact of vehicle-to-grid on battery longevity is not yet well understood. In fact,
Dubarry et al. (2017) claim that such degradation is severe, while Uddin et al. (2017) claim that
vehicle-to-grid may actually extend battery lifetime. In (Uddin et al., 2018), the authors of these
two studies reconcile their contradictory findings by concluding that the impact of vehicle-to-grid
depends on the operating conditions of the battery, such as its temperature and variations in its
state-of-charge. We further justify our no-degradation assumption by restricting the battery state-
of-charge to lie within 20% and 80% of the nominal battery capacity. Thompson (2018) suggests
these restrictions as a rule of thumb for extending the lifetime of common lithium-ion batteries, and
Sweda et al. (2017) adopt similar rules to optimize recharging policies of electric vehicles. Models
6
that account for battery degradation are studied by He et al. (2016) and Carpentier et al. (2019).
Our second key assumption is that vehicle owners can specify time and energy windows for
their driving needs one day in advance. This assumption makes sense for commuters who adhere to
predictable daily routines, for example.
The third key assumption is that all market bids are competitive enough to be accepted and
that an individual vehicle owner influences neither the market prices nor the grid frequency. Gen-
erally speaking, bids are competitive whenever the marginal costs of regulation provision are low.
This is indeed the case for vehicle owners engaging in vehicle-to-grid thanks to the previous two
assumptions, which imply that there are neither costs for battery degradation nor for the vehicle’s
reduced availability for mobility services. In addition, it is certainly reasonable to assume that no
single electric vehicle can impact the market prices or the grid frequency. Indeed, one vehicle may
cover at most several kilowatts of the 700 megawatts required for frequency regulation in France. A
model of a regulation provider influencing the grid frequency is described by Mercier et al. (2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the vehicle owner’s decision problem and
expresses it as a non-convex robust optimization problem in continuous time. In Sections 3 and 4
we show that this decision problem can be reformulated equivalently as a non-convex robust opti-
mization problem in discrete time and even as a tractable linear program, respectively. Numerical
experiments are discussed in Section 5, and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
Notation. All random variables are designated by tilde signs. Their realizations are denoted by
the same symbols without tildes. Vectors and matrices are denoted by lowercase and uppercase
boldface letters, respectively. For any z ∈ R, we define [z]+ = max{z, 0} and [z]− = max{−z, 0}
such that z = z+− z−. The intersection of a set A ⊆ Rd with Rd+ is denoted by A+. For any closed
intervals T ,U ⊆ R, we define L(T ,U) as the space of all Riemann integrable functions f : T → U ,
and we denote the intersection of B ⊆ L(T ,R) with L(T ,R+) as B+.
2 Problem Description
Consider an electric vehicle whose state at any time t is characterized by the amount of energy y(t)
stored in its battery and the instantaneous power consumption for driving d(t). We require that
y(t) is never smaller than
¯
y and never larger than y¯. To mitigate battery degradation, we set these
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limits to 20% and 80% of the nominal battery capacity, respectively. The battery interacts with
the power grid through a bidirectional charger with charging efficiency η+ ∈ (0, 1] and discharging
efficiency η− ∈ (0, 1], where an efficiency of 1 corresponds to a lossless energy conversion between the
grid and the battery. The charger is further characterized by its maximum power consumption y¯+(t)
from the grid and its maximum power provision to the grid y¯−(t). The power the battery can charge
or discharge is therefore limited by η+y¯+(t) and 1
η− y¯
−(t), respectively. Note that y¯+(t) and y¯−(t)
depend on the charger to which the vehicle is connected at time t. When the vehicle is not connected
to any charger, e.g., when it is driving, then both y¯+(t) and y¯−(t) must vanish. A stationary battery
can be modeled by setting d(t) = 0 and keeping y¯+(t) and y¯−(t) constant for all t.
In order to charge the battery at time t, the vehicle owner may buy power xb(t) from the
local utility at a known time-varying price pb(t) as is the case under dynamic pricing schemes or
day/night tariffs. In addition, she may also use the vehicle battery to earn extra revenue by providing
primary frequency regulation, which can be viewed as an insurance bought by the transmission
system operator (TSO) to balance unforeseen mismatches of electricity demand and supply in real-
time (Glover et al., 2010). If there is more supply than demand, the frequency of the power grid
rises. Conversely, if there is more demand than supply, the frequency falls. A battery owner
offering regulation power xr(t) at time t is obliged to increase her nominal power consumption xb(t)
from the grid by δ(t)xr(t), where δ(t) quantifies the normalized deviation of the instantaneous grid
frequency f(t) from its nominal value f0 (Gestionnaire du Réseau de Transport d’Electricité, 2009).
Formally, we have
δ(t) =

+1 if f(t) > f0 + ∆f,
f(t)−f0
∆f if f0 −∆f ≤ f(t) ≤ f0 + ∆f,
−1 if f(t) < f0 −∆f,
where ∆f > 0 is a threshold beyond which all promised regulation power must be delivered.
The TSO contracts frequency regulation as an insurance over a prescribed planning horizon
of length T , e.g., one day. According to French market rules (Réseau de transport d’électricité,
2017a), the vehicle owner needs to communicate xb(t) and xr(t) to the TSO before the beginning
of the planning horizon, e.g., one day ahead at noon. The TSO compensates the vehicle owner
for the frequency regulation xr(t) made available at the availability price pa(t) and charges her for
the increase δ(t)xr(t) in her power consumption at the delivery price pd(t). Note that this charge
becomes negative (i.e., it becomes a remuneration) if δ(t) is negative. In summary, the vehicle
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owner’s total cost over the planning horizon T = [0, T ] amounts to∫ T
0
pb(t)xb(t)−
(
pa(t) + δ(t)pd(t)
)
xr(t) dt.
The impact of providing frequency regulation on the battery state-of-charge depends on how the
vehicle owner adjusts the power consumed from and the power injected into the grid to achieve the
desired net power consumption xb(t) + δ(t)xr(t). The most energy-efficient way is to avoid unneces-
sary energy conversion losses resulting from simultaneously charging and discharging. Sometimes,
however, such losses can be attractive, for example if the battery is almost full and receives a request
for down-regulation (δ(t) > 0). Zhou et al. (2016) show that energy losses can also be attractive
when electricity prices are negative. Since common chargers are not able to simultaneously charge
and discharge, we forbid this option and set the charging rate to
y+
(
xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)
)
=
[
xb(t) + δ(t)xr(t)
]+
(1a)
and the discharging rate to
y−
(
xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)
)
=
[
xb(t) + δ(t)xr(t)
]−
. (1b)
Remark 1. When operating a vehicle fleet, some vehicles could charge while others discharge,
which suggests that the regulation profits achievable with n vehicles may exceed the regulation
profit of a single vehicle multiplied by n. In this paper, we focus on the case n = 1.
The power exchanged with the grid and the power needed for driving determine the battery
state-of-charge at any time t via the integral equation
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
= y0 +
∫ t
0
η+y+
(
xb(t′), xr(t′), δ(t′)
)
− y
− (xb(t′), xr(t′), δ(t′))
η−
− d(t′) dt′, (2)
where y0 represents the state-of-charge at time 0. For later use, we establish here some basic
properties of the battery state-of-charge.
Proposition 1. Holding all other factors fixed, the battery state-of-charge y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) is concave
nondecreasing in xb, concave in xr, concave nondecreasing in δ, and linear nondecreasing in y0.
Proof. By definition we have
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
=y0 +
∫ t
0
η+
[
xb(t′) + δ(t′)xr(t′)
]+ − [xb(t′) + δ(t′)xr(t′)]−
η−
− d(t′) dt′
=y0 +
∫ t
0
min
{
η+
(
xb(t′) + δ(t′)xr(t′)
)
,
xb(t′) + δ(t′)xr(t′)
η−
}
− d(t′) dt′,
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where the second equality holds because η+ < 1
η− . The postulated properties of y(x
b, xr, δ, y0, t)
follow from the observation that the minimum of two (nondecreasing) affine functions is a concave
(nondecreasing) function (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, p. 73).
At the time when the vehicle owner needs to choose and report the market commitments xb(t)
and xr(t), she has no knowledge of the uncertain future frequency deviations δ(t) and the delivery
prices pd(t) at time t ∈ T . In addition, she has no means to predict the battery state-of-charge
y0 at the beginning of the planning horizon, which depends on market commitments chosen on the
previous day and on the uncertain frequency deviations to be revealed until time 0. By contrast,
the availability prices pa(t) for t ∈ T can be assumed to be known at the planning time. In practice,
these prices are determined by an auction. As the vehicle owner bids an offer curve expressing xr(t)
as a function of pa(t) for any t ∈ T , it is as if the availability prices were known upfront.2.
We first discuss the uncertainty in the frequency deviations, which limits the amount of reserve
power that can be sold on the market. Indeed, the vehicle owner must ensure that the battery state-
of-charge will never drop below
¯
y or exceed y¯ when the TSO requests down-regulation (δ(t) < 0)
or up-regulation (δ(t) > 0), respectively, for a prescribed set of conceivable frequency deviation
scenarios. Otherwise, the vehicle owner may not be able to honor her market commitments, in
which case the TSO may charge a penalty or even ban her from the market.
The TSO defines under what conditions regulation providers must be able to deliver the promised
regulation power, keeping in mind that extreme frequency deviations are uncommon. Indeed, be-
tween 2015 and 2018 the frequency deviation δ(t) has never attained its theoretical maximum of 1
or its theoretical minimum of −1 in the French market.3 In the following, we thus assume that
the vehicle owner needs to guarantee the delivery of regulation power only for frequency deviation
scenarios within the uncertainty set
D =
{
δ ∈ L (T , [−1, 1]) :
∫ t
[t−Γ]+
∣∣δ(t′)∣∣ dt′ ≤ γ ∀t ∈ T }
parametrized by the duration Γ ∈ R+ of a regulation cycle and the duration γ ∈ R+ of an activation
period. Throughout this paper, we assume that 0 < γ ≤ Γ ≤ T . By focusing on frequency deviation
scenarios in D, one stipulates that consecutive extreme frequency deviations δ(t) ∈ {−1, 1} can
2The bidding process is described at https://www.entsoe.eu/network_codes/eb/fcr/.
3The French TSO publicizes frequency measurements at http://clients.rte-france.com/.
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occur at most over one activation period within each regulation cycle. The activation ratio γ/Γ
can thus be interpreted as the percentage of time during which the vehicle owner must be able to
deliver all committed reserve power.
Remark 2. Note that the uncertainty set D grows with γ and shrinks with Γ.
Besides displaying favorable computational properties, the uncertainty set D has conceptual
appeal because it formalizes the delivery guarantee rules prescribed by the European Commission
(2017). These rules stipulate that the “minimum activation period to be ensured by [frequency
regulation] providers [is not to be] greater than 30 or smaller than 15 minutes.” This guideline
prompts us to set γ = 30 minutes. The EU further demands that regulation providers “shall ensure
the recovery of [their] energy reservoirs as soon as possible, within 2 hours after the end of the alert
state.” This means that, although there may be several activation periods of 30 minutes within any
2.5 hour interval, the regulation provider only has to cover one of them. Thus, we set Γ = 2.5 hours.
In the following, we compare the empirical distribution of the daily variance of δ between the
years 2015 and 2018 with the maximum variance that can be achieved by any hypothetical frequency
deviation scenario δ ∈ D for a planning horizon of one day. By slight abuse of notation, we define the
variance of a frequency deviation scenario δ with respect to zero as Var(δ) = 1T
∫ T
0 δ(t)
2 dt. This is
justified because the TSO protects the system against unforeseen demand and supply fluctuations,
which means that the frequency deviations should be unbiased and thus vanish on average. Indeed,
the empirical frequency deviations have an average of 5.98 · 10−4.
Proposition 2. If δ ∈ D, then Var(δ) ≤ dT/Γeγ/T .
Proof. We will show that maxδ∈D Var(δ) ≤ β/T , where β = dT/Γeγ. To this end, we note that
max
δ∈D
Var(δ) = max
δ∈D+
Var(δ) ≤ max
δ∈Dβ
Var(δ), (3)
where Dβ = {δ ∈ L(T , [0, 1]) :
∫ T
0 δ(t) dt ≤ β}. The equality in (3) holds because Var(δ) remains
unchanged when δ(t) is replaced with |δ(t)| for every t ∈ T . Moreover, the inequality holds because
D+ ⊆ Dβ . To see this, observe that for any δ ∈ D+ we have
∫ T
0
δ(t) dt =
dT/Γe∑
n=1
∫ min{nΓ,T}
(n−1)Γ
δ(t) dt ≤
⌈
T
Γ
⌉
∆t = β.
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Figure 1. Empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the daily standard devi-
ation of δ and the maximum standard deviation of any scenario in Dˆ or in D.
Note that Dβ constitutes a budget uncertainty set of the type introduced by Bertsimas and Sim
(2004), where the uncertainty budget β corresponds to the maximum number of regulation cycles
within the planning horizon multiplied by the duration of an activation period. Thus, β can be
viewed as the maximum amount of time within the planning horizon during which all reserve
commitments must be honored. By weak duality, the highest variance of any scenario in Dβ satisfies
max
δ∈Dβ
Var(δ) ≤min
λ≥0
max
δ∈L(T ,[0,1])
1
T
∫ T
0
δ2(t) dt+ λ
(
β −
∫ T
0
δ(t) dt
)
= min
λ≥0
λβ + max
δ∈L(T ,[0,1])
∫ T
0
δ(t) (δ(t)/T − λ) dt
= min
λ≥0
λβ + T max
δ∈[0,1]
δ (δ/T − λ)
= min
λ≥0
λβ + max {0, 1− λT}
= min
λ≥0
max {λβ, 1− λ (T − β)} = β
T
.
The claim now follows by substituting the above result into (3) and recalling the definition of β.
Figure 1 shows that if T = 1 day, γ = 30 minutes, and Γ = 2.5 hours, then the maximum
standard deviation of any δ ∈ D exceeds the maximum empirical standard deviation by a factor
of 2.5. Thus, D contains extreme frequency deviation scenarios with unrealistically high variance.
The optimization model developed below not only involves the conservative uncertainty set D
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compatible with the guidelines of the European Commission but also a smaller uncertainty set
Dˆ =
{
δ ∈ L (T , [−1, 1]) :
∫ t
[t−Γˆ]+
∣∣δ(t′)∣∣ dt′ ≤ γˆ ∀t ∈ T }
parametrized by Γˆ ≥ Γ and γˆ ≤ γ. This uncertainty set contains only frequency deviation scenarios
that are likely to materialize under normal operating conditions. Note that Dˆ is obtained from D
by inflating Γ to Γˆ and shrinking γ to γˆ. By Remark 2, we may thus conclude that Dˆ is indeed
a subset of D. While the pessimistic uncertainty set D is used to enforce the stringent delivery
guarantees imposed by the European Commission, the more optimistic uncertainty set Dˆ is used to
model a softer reachability guarantee for the terminal state-of-charge. In the numerical experiments
we will set Γˆ = T = 1 day and γˆ = γ = 30 minutes. By Proposition 2, the variance of all frequency
deviation scenarios in Dˆ is therefore bounded above by ∆t/T = 1/48. Empirically, this threshold
exceeds the variance of the frequency deviation on 99.2% of all days in the years from 2017 to 2018.
Next, we discuss the uncertainty in the initial battery state-of-charge y0. Recall that y0 is
uncertain at the time when xb and xr are chosen because it depends on how much regulation energy
must be provided until the beginning of the planning horizon. This quantity depends itself on
uncertain frequency deviations that have not yet been revealed. We assume that the vehicle owner
constructs two confidence intervals Y0 = [
¯
y0, y¯0] and Yˆ0 = [
¯
yˆ0, ˆ¯y0] for y0, either taking into account
all frequency deviations under which she must imperatively be able to deliver regulation power or
only those frequency deviations that are likely to occur under normal operating conditions.
The only assumption we make about the uncertainty in the delivery price pd is that the vehicle
owner can reliably estimate the expected regulation price pr(t) = pa(t) + E[δ˜(t)p˜d(t)].
We are now ready to formalize the vehicle owner’s decision problem for selecting the market
decisions xb, xr ∈ X ⊆ L(T ,R+). The primary objective is to minimize the expected cost
c(xb, xr) = E
∫
T
pb(t)xb(t)−
(
pa(t) + δ˜(t)p˜d(t)
)
xr(t) dt′ =
∫
T
pb(t)xb(t)− pr(t)xr(t) dt, (4)
while ensuring that xb and xr are robustly feasible across all frequency deviation scenarios δ ∈ D
and initial battery states y0 ∈ Y0. Mathematically, the charging rate y+(xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)), the
discharging rate y−(xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)), and the battery state-of-charge y(xb, xr, δ, t, y0) must therefore
satisfy the robust constraints
y+(xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)) ≤ y¯+(t), y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) ≤ y¯,
y−(xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)) ≤ y¯−(t), y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) ≥
¯
y
∀t ∈ T , ∀δ ∈ D, ∀y0 ∈ Y0.
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As the vehicle owner continues to use the vehicle for driving and for offering grid services after the
end of the planning horizon, the battery should end up in a state that is “conducive to satisfactory
future operations” (Yeh, 1985). Consequently, the vehicle owner aims to steer y(xb, xr, δ, y0, T ) close
to a desired target state-of-charge y?. As y0 and δ are uncertain, it is typically impossible to meet
the target state-of-charge exactly. To trade off present and future costs, it is therefore reasonable to
minimize |y(xb, xr, δ, y0, T )−y?| in view of the worst of all scenarios δ ∈ Dˆ and y0 ∈ Yˆ0. This can be
achieved by adding the term maxδ∈Dˆmaxy0∈Yˆ0 p
?|y(xb, xr, δ, y0, T ) − y?| to the objective function,
where p? represents a prescribed penalty parameter. Both y? and p? can be determined through
cross-validation based on historical data (see Section 5).
In summary, the vehicle owner’s decision problem can be cast as the following robust optimiza-
tion problem in continuous time.
min
xb,xr∈X
c(xb, xr) + max
δ∈Dˆ, y0∈Yˆ0
p?
∣∣∣y(xb, xr, δ, T, y0)− y?∣∣∣
s.t. y+(xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)) ≤ y¯+(t) ∀δ ∈ D, ∀t ∈ T
y−(xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)) ≤ y¯−(t) ∀δ ∈ D, ∀t ∈ T
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) ≤ y¯ ∀δ ∈ D, ∀t ∈ T , ∀y0 ∈ Y0
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) ≥
¯
y ∀δ ∈ D, ∀t ∈ T , ∀y0 ∈ Y0
(R)
By using the conservative uncertainty sets D and Y0 in the constraints, the vehicle owner ensures
that she can fulfill the delivery guarantee dictated by the European Commission. Failing to fulfill
this guarantee might lead to exclusion from the regulation market. In contrast, there are no serious
consequences of missing the desired terminal state-of-charge. Hence, it makes sense to use the less
conservative uncertainty sets Dˆ and Yˆ0 in the objective function. The use of different uncertainty
sets in the same model has previously been proposed in the context of robust portfolio optimization
by Zymler et al. (2011).
Recall from Proposition 1 that the function y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) is concave in the decision variables xb
and xr. Upper bounds on this function thus constitute non-convex constraints. This implies that (R)
represents an infinite-dimensional non-convex robust optimization problem with functional decision
variables and functional uncertain parameters. In general, such problems are severely intractable.
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3 Time Discretization
In line with standard market practice, we assume henceforth that the utility and the TSO accept
only constant market bids over the trading intervals Tk = [(k−1)∆t, k∆t) for all k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K},
whereK = T∆t ∈ N. In the French electricity market, for example, the length ∆t of a trading interval
is set to 30 minutes. We further assume that the power demand for driving and the maximum
charge and discharge power of the vehicle charger remain constant over the trading intervals. This
assumption is justified because a vehicle that is both driving and parking in the same trading
interval cannot offer constant market bids and is therefore unable to participate in the electricity
market. Although the power demand for driving may fluctuate wildly, the battery state-of-charge
cannot increase while the vehicle is driving, and therefore the power consumption for driving can be
averaged over trading intervals without loss of generality. Note that we do not assume the frequency
deviation scenarios δ to remain constant over the trading intervals. In practice δ may fluctuate on
time scales of the order of milliseconds, and averaging out the frequency deviations across a trading
interval could result in a dangerous oversimplification of reality.
To formalize the reasoning about piecewise constant functions, we introduce a lifting operator
L : RK → L(T ,R) that maps any vector v ∈ RK to a piecewise constant function Lv with K
pieces defined through (Lv)(t) = vk if t ∈ Tk, k ∈ K. We also introduce the adjoint operator
L† : L(T ,R) → RK that maps any function w ∈ L(T ,R) to a K-dimensional vector L†w defined
through (L†w)k = 1∆t
∫
Tk w(t) d(t) for all k ∈ K. Note that L and L† are indeed adjoint to each
other because
∫
T (Lv)(t)w(t) dt = v
>L†(w) for all v ∈ RK and w ∈ L(T ,R). Mathematically, we
impose from now on the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The functions d, y¯+ and y¯− are piecewise constant, that is, there exist d, y¯+, y¯− ∈
RK such that d = Ld, y¯+ = Ly¯+ and y¯− = Ly¯−. In addition, the feasible set X contains only
piecewise constant functions, that is, for every x ∈ X there exists x ∈ RK such that x = Lx.
Next, we introduce a discretized uncertainty set
DK =
δ ∈ [−1, 1]K :
k∑
l=1+[k−Γ/∆t]+
|δl| ≤ γ
∆t
∀k ∈ K

reminiscent of D, where Γ/∆t and γ/∆t count the trading intervals within a regulation cycle and an
activation period, respectively. Similarly, we define a smaller discretized uncertainty set DˆK ⊆ RK
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reminiscent of Dˆ, which is obtained from DK by replacing Γ with Γˆ and γ with γˆ. In the remainder
we impose the following divisibility assumption.
Assumption 2. The parameters Γ, γ, Γˆ and γˆ are (positive) multiplies of ∆t.
The discretized uncertainty sets are of interest because of the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The following statements hold.
(i) LDK ⊆ D and L†D = DK.
(ii) LD+K ⊆ D+ and L†D+ = D+K.
Proof. As for assertion (i) we first prove that LDK ⊆ D. To this end, select any δ ∈ DK, and define
δ = Lδ. It is easy to see that δ ∈ L(T , [−1, 1]). Next, select any t ∈ T . If t ≤ Γ, note that∫ t
[t−Γ]+
|δ(t′)| dt′ =
∫ t
0
|δ(t′)|dt′ ≤
∫ Γ
0
|δ(t′)|dt′ = ∆t
∆k∑
l=1
|δl| ≤ γ,
where the auxiliary parameter ∆k = Γ/∆t is integral thanks to Assumption 2. The second inequality
in the above expression holds because δ ∈ DK. If t ≥ Γ, on the other hand, we define k = d t∆te and
α = d t∆te − t∆t ∈ [0, 1). Then, we find∫ t
[t−Γ]+
|δ(t′)|dt′ =
∫ (k−∆k)∆t
t−Γ
|δ(t′)| dt′ +
∫ (k−1)∆t
(k−∆k)∆t
|δ(t′)| dt′ +
∫ t
(k−1)∆t
|δ(t′)|dt′
= (k∆t− t) |δk−∆k|+ ∆t
k−1∑
l=k−∆k+1
|δl|+ (t− (k − 1) ∆t) |δk|
=∆t
(
α
k−1∑
l=k−∆k
|δl|+ (1− α)
k∑
l=k−∆k+1
|δl|
)
≤ γ,
where the inequality holds because δ ∈ DK, which ensures that both
∑k−1
l=k−∆k |δl| and
∑k
l=k−∆k+1 |δl|
are smaller or equal to γ/∆t. As t ∈ T was chosen arbitrarily, this implies that δ ∈ LDK. In sum-
mary, we have shown that LDK ⊆ D.
Next, we show that L†D ⊆ DK. To this end, select any δ ∈ D and define δ = L†δ. It is easy to
see that δ ∈ [−1, 1]K . Moreover, for any k ∈ K we have
k∑
l=1+[k−Γ/∆t]+
δl =
k∑
l=1+[k−Γ/∆t]+
1
∆t
∫
Tl
δ(t′) dt′ =
1
∆t
∫ k∆t
[k∆t−Γ]+
δ(t′) dt′ ≤ γ
∆t
,
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where the inequality holds because δ ∈ D. As k ∈ K was chosen arbitrarily, this implies that
δ ∈ L†D. In summary, we have shown that L†D ⊆ DK.
Finally, we prove that DK ⊆ L†D. To this end, we observe that L†L coincides with the identity
mapping on RK . As LDK ⊆ D, this implies that
DK = L†LDK ⊆ L†D.
Since both L†D ⊆ DK and DK ⊆ L†D, we have in fact shown that L†D = DK. Thus assertion (i)
follows. Assertion (ii) can be proved in a similar manner. Details are omitted for brevity.
In order to discretize problem (R), we define the finite-dimensional feasible set XK = L†X .
As X contains only piecewise constant functions by virtue of Assumption 1, we have X = LXK.
We further define the finite-dimensional cost function cK(xb,xr) = c(Lxb, Lxr), which is linear in
xb ∈ RK and xr ∈ RK . In addition, for any k ∈ K we define the finite-dimensional function
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
= y
(
Lxb, Lxr, Lδ, y0, k∆t
)
= y0 + ∆t
k∑
l=1
η+y+(xbl , x
r
l , δl)−
1
η−
y−(xbl , x
r
l , δl)− dl, (5)
which represents the battery state-of-charge at the end of period k under the assumption that the
market bids and the frequency deviations are piecewise constant.
Proposition 4. Holding all other factors fixed, yk(xb,xr, δ, y0) is concave nondecreasing in xb,
concave in xr, concave nondecreasing in δ, and linear nondecreasing in y0 for any k ∈ K.
Proof. The proof widely parallels that of Proposition 1 and is therefore omitted.
We are now ready to define the discrete-time counterpart of the robust optimization problem (R).
min
xb,xr∈XK
cK(xb,xr) + max
δ∈DˆK,y0∈Yˆ0
p?
∣∣∣yK(xb,xr, δ, y0)− y?∣∣∣
s.t. y+(xbk, x
r
k, δk) ≤ y¯+k ∀δ ∈ DK, ∀k ∈ K
y−(xbk, x
r
k, δk) ≤ y¯−k ∀δ ∈ DK, ∀k ∈ K
yk(x
b,xr, δ, y0) ≤ y¯ ∀δ ∈ DK, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, ∀y0 ∈ Y0
yk(x
b,xr, δ, y0) ≥
¯
y ∀δ ∈ DK, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, ∀y0 ∈ Y0
(RK)
17
Unlike the original problem (R), the discrete-time counterpart (RK) constitutes a finite-dimensional
robust optimization problem, i.e., it involves finitely many decision variables and uncertain pa-
rameters. The hope is that (RK) is therefore easier to solve than (R). Before investigating its
computational tractability, however, we will first prove that (RK) is equivalent to (R).
Theorem 1 (Lossless time discretization). The problems (R) and (RK) are equivalent.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on Propositions 5–8 below.
Proposition 5. The following equivalences hold.
(i) y+
(
xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)
)
≤ y¯+(t) ∀δ ∈ D, ∀t ∈ T ⇐⇒ y+k
(
xbk, x
r
k, δk
)
≤ y¯+k ∀δ ∈ DK, ∀k ∈ K
(ii) y−
(
xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)
)
≤ y¯−(t) ∀δ ∈ D, ∀t ∈ T ⇐⇒ y−k
(
xbk, x
r
k, δk
)
≤ y¯−k ∀δ ∈ DK, ∀k ∈ K
Proof. Assertion (i) can be reexpressed as
max
t∈T
max
δ∈D
y+
(
xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)
)
− y¯+(t) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ max
k∈K
max
δ∈DK
y+k
(
xbk, x
r
k, δk
)
− y¯+k ≤ 0.
We will prove this equivalence by showing that
max
t∈T
max
δ∈D
y+
(
xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)
)
− y¯+(t) = max
k∈K
max
δ∈DK
y+k
(
xbk, x
r
k, δk
)
− y¯+k .
Indeed, a direct calculation reveals that
max
t∈T
max
δ∈D
y+
(
xb(t), xr(t), δ(t)
)
− y¯+(t) = max
t∈T
max
−1≤δ(t)≤1
[
xb(t) + δ(t)xr(t)
]+ − y¯+(t)
= max
t∈T
xb(t) + xr(t)− y¯+(t)
= max
k∈K
xbk + x
r
k − y¯+k
= max
k∈K
max
−1≤δk≤1
[
xbk + δkx
r
k
]+ − y¯+k
= max
k∈K
max
δ∈DK
y+
(
xbk, x
r
k, δk
)
− y¯+k ,
(7)
where the first equality follows from the definition of y+ in (1a) and the observation that {δ(t) :
δ ∈ D} = [−1, 1], while the second equality holds because xb(t) ≥ 0 and xr(t) ≥ 0 which implies
that δ(t) = 1 maximizes the instantaneous charging rate. The third equality exploits Assumption 1
whereby xb, xr, and y¯+ are piecewise constant functions. The fourth equality holds because xbk ≥ 0
and xrk ≥ 0 which implies that δk = 1 maximizes the per-period charging rate. The fifth equality
follows again from the definition of y+k in (1a) and the observation that {δk : δ ∈ DK} = [−1, 1].
The proof of assertion (ii) is similar and therefore omitted.
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Proposition 6. The following equivalence holds.
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
≤ y¯ ∀δ ∈ D,∀t ∈ T ⇐⇒ yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
≤ y¯ ∀δ ∈ DK, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}
Proof. The claim follows if we can show that
max
t∈T
max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
= max
k∈K∪{0}
max
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
. (8)
To this end, assume first that t = k∆t for some k ∈ K ∪ {0}. In this case, we have
max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
= max
δ∈D+
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
=y0 + max
δ∈D+
∫ t
0
η+
(
xb(t′) + δ(t′)xr(t′)
)
− d(t′) dt′
=y0 + max
δ∈D+
k∑
l=1
∫
Tl
η+
(
xbl + δ(t
′)xrl
)
− dl dt′
=y0 + max
δ∈D+
∆t
k∑
l=1
η+
(
xbl + (L
†δ)lxrl
)
− dl
=y0 + max
δ∈D+K
∆t
k∑
l=1
η+
(
xbl + δlx
r
l
)
− dl
= max
δ∈D+K
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
= max
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
,
(9)
where the first equality holds because δ ∈ D if and only if |δ| ∈ D+ and because y is nondecreasing
in δ thanks to Proposition 1. The second equality follows from the definitions of y, y+, and y− and
from the non-negativity of xb, xr and δ. The third equality exploits Assumption 1 whereby d, xb
and xr are piecewise constant. As δ is integrated against a piecewise constant function, it may be
averaged over the trading intervals without changing its objective function value. The fifth equality
then follows from Proposition 3, while the sixth equality follows from the definitions of yk, y+ and
y− and from the non-negativity of xb, xr and δ. The seventh equality, finally, holds because δ ∈ DK
if and only if |δ| ∈ D+K and because yk is nondecreasing in δ thanks to Proposition 5.
Assume now more generally that t ∈ Tk for some k ∈ K. If the vehicle is driving in trading
interval Tk, then y¯+(t) = y¯−(t) = 0 for all t ∈ Tk. Thus, we have
max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
= max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, (k − 1)∆t
)
−
∫ t
(k−1)∆t
d(t′) dt′
≤max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, (k − 1)∆t
)
= max
δ∈DK
yk−1
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
∀t ∈ Tk,
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where the inequality holds because d(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ Tk, and the second equality follows from the
first part of the proof. Alternatively, if the vehicle is parked in trading interval Tk, then d(t) = 0
for all t ∈ Tk. Thus, we have
max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
= max
δ∈D+
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
= max
δ∈D+
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, (k − 1)∆t
)
+
∫ t
(k−1)∆t
η+y+
(
xb(t′), xr(t′), δ(t′)
)
dt′
≤ max
δ∈D+
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, k∆t
)
= max
δ∈D+K
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
= max
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
for all t ∈ Tk, where the inequality holds because the integral is nondecreasing in t, and the equalities
follow from the first part of the proof. In summary, we have shown that
max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
≤ max
{
max
δ∈DK
yk−1
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
, max
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)}
for all t ∈ Tk and k ∈ K. This implies that
max
t∈T
max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
≤ max
k∈K∪{0}
max
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
.
On the other hand, we have
max
t∈T
max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
≥ max
k∈K∪{0}
max
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, k∆t
)
= max
k∈K∪{0}
max
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
,
where the equality follows from the first part of the proof. Combining the above inequalities im-
plies (8), and thus the claim follows.
Proposition 7. The following equivalence holds.
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) ≥
¯
y ∀δ ∈ D, ∀t ∈ T ⇐⇒ yk(xb,xr, δ, y0) ≥
¯
y ∀δ ∈ DK, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}
The proof of Proposition 7 relies on Lemmas 1 and 2 below.
Lemma 1. If f : R × T → R is concave, continuous and nonincreasing in its first argument and
piecewise constant on the trading intervals Tk, k ∈ K, in its second argument, then
min
δ∈D+
∫ t
0
f
(
δ(t′), t′
)
dt′ = min
δ∈D+∩L(T ,{0,1})
∫ t
0
f
(
δ(t′), t′
)
dt′ ∀t ∈ T .
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Proof. For ease of exposition, assume first that t = T and define tk = ∆t(k − 1) for every k ∈ K.
For every approximation parameter N ∈ N we define N = {1, . . . , N} and set
T Nk,n =
[
∆t
(
k − 1 + n− 1
N
)
,∆t
(
k − 1 + n
N
))
∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ N .
Note that the T Nk,n, n ∈ N , are mutually disjoint and that their union coincides with the k-th
trading interval Tk. Next, introduce a lifting operator LN : RK×N → L(T ,R) defined through
(LNδ)(t) = δk,n if t ∈ T Nk,n for k ∈ K and n ∈ N . In addition, let L†N : L(T ,R) → RK×N be the
corresponding adjoint operator defined through (L†Nδ)k,n =
N
∆t
∫
T Nk,n δ(t) dt for k ∈ K and n ∈ N .
Using this notation, we first prove that
lim
N→∞
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f
(
(L†Nδ)k,n, tk
) ∆t
N
=
∫ T
0
f (δ(t), t) dt (10)
for any fixed δ ∈ D+. As f is continuous and nonincreasing in its first argument and piecewise
constant in its second argument, we have
inf
t∈T Nk,n
f (δ(t), t) = f
(
sup
t∈T Nk,n
δ(t), tk
)
≤ f
((
L†Nδ
)
k,n
, tk
)
≤ f
(
inf
t∈T Nk,n
δ(t), tk
)
= sup
t∈T Nk,n
f (δ(t), t)
for every k ∈ K, n ∈ N and N ∈ N. Summing over k and n thus yields
∑
n∈N
inf
t∈T Nk,n
f (δ(t), t)
∆t
N
∑
k∈K
≤
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f
((
L†Nδ
)
k,n
, tk
)
∆t
N
≤
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
sup
t∈T Nk,n
f (δ(t), t)
∆t
N
for every N ∈ N. As f(δ(t), t) constitutes a composition of a continuous function with a Riemann
integrable function, it is also Riemann integrable. Thus, the lower and upper Riemann sums in
the above inequality both converge to
∫ T
0 f(δ(t), t) dt as N tends to infinity. This observation
establishes (10). As δ ∈ D+ was chosen arbitrarily, we may thus conclude that
inf
δ∈D+
∫ T
0
f (δ(t), t) dt = inf
δ∈D+
lim
N→∞
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f
((
L†Nδ
)
k,n
, tk
)
∆t
N
.
For the following derivations we introduce the auxiliary uncertainty set
D+KN =
δ ∈ [−1, 1]KN :
m∑
l=1+[m−NΓ/∆t]+
δl ≤ N γ
∆t
∀m = 1, . . . ,KN

for N ∈ N. By slight abuse of notation, we henceforth naturally identify any matrix δ ∈ RK×N
with the vector obtained by concatenating the rows of δ. This convention allows us, for example,
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to write δ ∈ D+KN even if δ was initially defined as a K ×N -matrix. By repeating the arguments
of Proposition 3, it is easy to show that LND+KN ⊆ D+ and L†ND+ = D+KN for all N ∈ N. Using
these relations, we will now prove that
inf
δ∈D+
∫ T
0
f (δ(t), t) dt = lim
N→∞
inf
δ∈D+KN
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f (δk,n, tk)
∆t
N
. (11)
To this end, select any  > 0 and δ? ∈ D+ with ∫ T0 f(δ?(t), t) dt ≤ infδ∈D+ ∫ t0 f(δ(t), t) dt + , and
choose N large enough such that∣∣∣∣∣∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f
((
L†Nδ
?
)
k,n
, tk
)
∆t
N
−
∫ T
0
f (δ?(t), t) dt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤  ∀N ≥ N.
Note that such an N exists thanks to (10). For any N ≥ N, we thus find
0 ≤ inf
δ∈D+KN
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f (δk,n, tk)
∆t
N
− inf
δ∈D+
∫ T
0
f (δ(t), t) dt
≤ inf
δ∈D+KN
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f (δk,n, tk)
∆t
N
−
∫ T
0
f (δ?(t), t) dt+ 
≤
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f
((
L†Nδ
?
)
k,n
, tk
)
∆t
N
−
∫ T
0
f (δ?(t), t) dt+  ≤ 2,
where the first inequality holds because LND+KN ⊆ D+, the second inequality follows from the
choice of δ?, the third inequality exploits the identity L†ND+ = D+KN , and the fourth inequality
holds because N ≥ N. As  > 0 was chosen arbitrarily, Equation (11) follows.
In order to prove that
inf
δ∈D+
∫ T
0
f (δ(t), t) dt = inf
δ∈D+∩L(T ,{0,1})
∫ T
0
f (δ(t), t) dt, (12)
we first observe that
inf
δ∈D+
∫ T
0
f (δ(t), t) dt = lim
N→∞
inf
δ∈D+KN
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f (δk,n, tk)
∆t
N
= lim
N→∞
inf
δ∈D+KN∩{0,1}KN
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f (δk,n, tk)
∆t
N
. (13)
Here, the first equality follows from (11), and the second equality holds because f is concave in its
first argument, which implies that the minimum over δ is attained at a vertex of the polyhedron
D+KN . As all vertices of D+KN are binary by virtue of Lemma 2 below, we can restrict δ to {0, 1}K×N
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without loss of optimality. To prove (12), select any  > 0 and N ∈ N large enough such that∣∣∣∣∣ minδ∈D+KN∩{0,1}K×N
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
f (δk,n, tk)
∆t
N
− inf
δ∈D+
∫ T
0
f (δ(t), t) dt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (14)
Note that such an N exists because of (13). Next, let δ? be a minimizer of the discrete optimization
problem on the left hand side of the above expression, and set δ? = LNδ?. By (14) and because δ?
is constant on the intervals T Nk,n, we thus have∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
f(δ?(t), t) dt− inf
δ∈D+
∫ T
0
f(δ(t), t) dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ .
As LND+KN ⊆ D+ and δ? ∈ {0, 1}K×N , we further have δ? ∈ D+ ∩ L(T , {0, 1}). As  was chosen
arbitrarily, Equation (12) follows.
If t ∈ T is a multiple of 1/KN for some N ∈ N, then f(δ(t′), t′) can be set to 0 for all t′ ≥ t, and
the above proof remains valid with obvious minor modifications. For any other t ∈ T , the claim
follows from a continuity argument. Details are omitted for brevity.
Lemma 2. For any N ∈ N, all vertices of the polyhedron
D+KN =
δ ∈ [0, 1]KN :
m∑
l=1+[m−NΓ/∆t]+
δl ≤ N γ
∆t
∀m = 1, . . . ,KN

are binary vectors.
Proof. The polyhedron D+KN can be represented more concisely as {δ ∈ RKN+ : Aδ ≤ b}, where
A =
C
I
 ∈ R2KN×KN , b =
N γ∆t1
1
 ∈ R2KN
and C ∈ RKN×KN is defined through Cij = 1 if i −NΓ/∆t < j ≤ i and Cij = 0 otherwise. Here,
I denotes the identity matrix and 1 the column vector of 1s in RKN . By construction, A is a
binary matrix where the 1s appear consecutively in each row. Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.10
by Nemhauser and Wolsey (1999) thus imply that A is totally unimodular. As b ∈ ZKN because of
Assumption 2, all vertices of D+KN are integral thanks to Proposition 2.2 again by Nemhauser and
Wolsey (1999). In addition, as D+KN ⊆ [0, 1]KN , the vertices of D+KN are in fact binary vectors.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 7.
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Proof of Proposition 7. The claim follows if we can show that
min
t∈T
min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) = min
k∈K∪{0}
min
δ∈DK
yk(x
b,xr, δ, y0). (15)
In the first part of the proof, we reformulate the continuous non-convex minimization problem
minδ∈D y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) as a continuous linear program. To ease notation, we set ∆η = 1η− −η+ ≥ 0
and define the auxiliary functions
χ(δ(t), t) = max
{
η+xr(t)δ(t),
1
η−
xr(t)δ(t)−∆η xb(t)
}
and
m(t) = max
{
η+xr(t),
1
η−
xr(t)−∆η xb(t)
}
for all t ∈ T . The function χ(δ(t), t) can be viewed as a nonlinear decision rule of the uncertain
frequency deviation δ(t). Using these conventions, we find
min
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, t
)
= min
δ∈D+
y
(
xb, xr,−δ, y0, t
)
= y0 + min
δ∈D+
∫ t
0
η+xb(t′)− χ (δ(t′), t′)− d(t′) dt′
= y0 + min
δ∈D+∩L(T ,{0,1})
∫ t
0
η+xb(t′)− χ (δ(t′), t′)− d(t′) dt′
= y0 + min
δ∈D+∩L(T ,{0,1})
∫ t
0
η+xb(t′)−m(t′)δ(t′)− d(t′) dt′
= y0 + min
δ∈D+
∫ t
0
η+xb(t′)−m(t′)δ(t′)− d(t′) dt′,
(16)
where the first equality holds because the statements δ ∈ D, −δ ∈ D and |δ| ∈ D+ are all equivalent
and because y is nondecreasing in δ thanks to Proposition 1. The second equality follows from the
definitions of y, y+, y− and χ, and the third equality is a direct consequence of Lemma 1, which
applies because−χ is concave and nonincreasing in its first argument and, by virtue of Assumption 1,
piecewise constant in its second argument. The fourth equality holds because χ(δ(t′), t′) = m(t′)δ(t′)
whenever δ(t′) ∈ {0, 1}, and the last equality follows again from Lemma 1. Note that m(t′)δ(t′)
constitutes a linear decision rule of δ(t).
In the second part of the proof we assume that t = k∆t for some k ∈ K ∪ {0} and show that
min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) = min
δ∈DK
yk(x
b,xr, δ, y0).
24
To this end, we define χl(δl) = max{η+xrl δl, 1η−xrl δl −∆η xbl} and ml = max{η+xrl ,
xrl
η− −∆η xbl} for
all l ∈ K. By (16), we thus have
min
δ∈D
y
(
xb, xr, δ, y0, k∆t
)
= y0 + min
δ∈D+
∫ k∆t
0
η+xb(t′)−m(t′)δ(t′)− d(t′) dt′
= y0 + min
δ∈D+
k∑
l=1
∫
Tl
η+xbl −mlδ(t′)− dl dt′
= y0 + min
δ∈D+K
∆t
k∑
l=1
η+xbl −mlδl − dl
= min
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y0
)
,
(17)
where the second equality holds because d, xb and xr are piecewise constant by virtue of Assump-
tion 1, which implies that m(t′) = ml for every t′ ∈ Tl. The third equality then follows from
Proposition 3. The fourth equality can be proved by reversing the arguments from (16) with obvi-
ous minor modifications. In fact, as the frequency deviation scenarios are now piecewise constant
and can be encoded by finite-dimensional vectors, the proof requires no cumbersome limiting argu-
ments as the ones developed in the proof of Lemma 1. We omit the details for brevity.
In the third part of the proof we assume that t ∈ Tk for some k ∈ K and show that
min
t∈Tk
min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) = min
l∈{k−1,k}
min
δ∈DK
yl(x
b,xr, δ, y0).
As in the proof of Proposition 6, we distinguish whether or not the vehicle is driving in period Tk.
Specifically, if the vehicle is driving in period Tk, then y¯+(t) = y¯−(t) = 0, which implies that
min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) = min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, (k − 1)∆t)−
∫ t
(k−1)∆t
d(t′) dt
= min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, k∆t) +
∫ k∆t
t
d(t′) dt
≥min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, k∆t) = min
δ∈DK
yk(x
b,xr, δ, y0).
Here, the inequality holds because d(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ Tk, and the last equality follows from (17).
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Otherwise, if the vehicle is parked in period Tk, then d(t) = 0 for all t ∈ Tk, and hence
min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t)
= y0 + min
δ∈D+
k−1∑
l=1
∫
Tl
η+xbl −mlδ(t′)− dl dt′ +
∫ t
(k−1)∆t
η+xbk −mkδ(t′) dt′
= y0 + min
δ∈D+(t)
∆t
k−1∑
l=1
η+xbl − dl + (t− (k − 1)∆t)η+xbk −
k∑
l=1
∫
Tl
mlδ(t
′) dt′
= y0 + ∆t
k−1∑
l=1
η+xbl − dl + (t− (k − 1)∆t)η+xbk − max
δ∈D+K(t)
∆t
k∑
l=1
mlδl,
(18)
where we use the time-dependent uncertainty sets
D+(t) =
{
δ ∈ D+ : δ(t′) = 0 ∀t′ ∈ [t, k∆t]
}
and D+K(t) =
{
δ ∈ D+K : δk ≤
t− (k − 1)∆t
∆t
}
to simplify the notation. The first equality in (18) follows from (16) and Assumption 1. Note
that δ(t′) does not impact the objective function of the resulting minimization problem over D+
for any t′ > t. It is therefore optimal to set δ(t′) = 0 for all t′ ≥ t and, in particular, for all
t′ ∈ [t, k∆t]. This restriction has no impact on the objective function but maximizes nature’s
flexibility in selecting harmful frequency deviations δ(t′) for t′ ≤ t. Hence, the second equality
in (18) follows. As δ is now integrated against a piecewise constant function, it may be averaged
over the trading intervals without changing its objective function value. The third equality in (18)
thus holds because L†D+(t) = D+K(t), which can be proved similarly to Proposition 3 by noting that
(L†δ)k = 1
∆t
∫ t
(k−1)∆t
δ(t′) dt′ ≤ t− (k − 1)∆t
∆t
∀δ ∈ D+(t).
In the following we show that (18) is piecewise affine in t. To this end, note that the optimization
problem in the last line of (18) can be expressed more concisely as the standard form linear program
min
z≥0
c>z
s.t. Az = b(t),
(19)
where z> = (δ>, s>) ∈ RK × R2K combines the (averaged) frequency deviations in the trading
intervals with a vector of slack variables. Here, the vector c ∈ R3K of objective function coefficients
is defined through cl = −ml∆t if l ≤ k and cl = 0 otherwise. The constraints involve the matrix
A =
C I 0
I 0 I
 ∈ R2K×3K ,
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where C ∈ RK×K is defined through Cij = 1 if i − Γ/∆t < j ≤ i and Cij = 0 otherwise, and
the vector b(t) ∈ R2K is defined through bl(t) = t−(k−1)∆t∆t if l = k + K and bl = 1 otherwise. By
Lemma 2 and Proposition 2.1 of Nemhauser and Wolsey (1999), A is totally unimodular.
Note that (19) is solvable for every t ∈ Tk because its feasible set is non-empty and compact.
Next, choose any t0 in the interior of Tk, denote by B an optimal basis matrix for problem (19)
at t = t0, and define z?(t) = B−1b(t) for all t ∈ Tk. In the following, we will use local sensitivity
analysis of linear programming to show that z?(t) is optimal in (19) for all t ∈ Tk. As the basis B
remains dual feasible when t deviates from t0, it suffices to show that
z?(t) = z?(t0) +
t− t0
∆t
B−1eK+k ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ Tk, (20)
where eK+k denotes the (K + k)-th standard basis vector in R2K (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis, 1997,
p. 207). To this end, note that B is a non-singular square matrix constructed from 2K columns
of A and is therefore also totally unimodular. Moreover, B−1 is totally unimodular because pivot
operations preserve total unimodularity (Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1999, Proposition 2.1). Hence,
we have B−1eK+k ∈ {−1, 0, 1}2K . By construction, we further have b(t) ∈ {0, 1}2K for t = k∆t,
which implies that z?(k∆t) ∈ Z2K . Evaluating (20) at t = k∆t then yields
z?(t0) = z
?(k∆t)− k∆t− t0
∆t
B−1eK+k,
which ensures that z?(k∆t) ≥ 0. Indeed, if any component of the integral vector z?(k∆t) was
strictly negative, it would have to be smaller or equal to −1. As t0 resides in the interior of Tk and
thus |(k∆t− t0)/∆t| < 1, the corresponding component of z?(t0) would then also have to be strictly
negative. This, however, contradicts the optimality of z?(t0), which implies that z?(t0) ≥ 0. Hence,
we have z?(k∆t) ≥ 0. One can use similar arguments to prove that z?((k − 1)∆t) ≥ 0. As z?(t) is
affine in t, it is indeed non-negative for all t ∈ Tk.
The above reasoning shows that z?(t) is optimal in (19) and that the minimum of (19) is affine
in t on Tk. Equation (18) further implies that minδ∈D y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) is affine in t on Tk, and thus
min
t∈Tk
min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, t) = min
l∈{k−1,k}
min
δ∈D
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, l∆t) = min
l∈{k−1,k}
min
δ∈DK
yl(x
b,xr, δ, y0),
where the second equality follows from (17). As k ∈ K was chosen arbitrarily, (15) follows.
Proposition 8. The following equality holds.
max
δ∈Dˆ,y0∈Yˆ0
p?|y(xb, xr, δ, y0, T )− y?| = max
δ∈DˆK,y0∈Yˆ0
p?|yK(xb,xr, δ, y0)− y?|
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Proof. By introducing an auxiliary epigraphical variable z, we find
max
δ∈Dˆ,y0∈Yˆ0
p?
∣∣∣y(xb, xr, δ, y0, T )− y?∣∣∣ =

min
z
p?z
s.t. z ≥ max
δ∈Dˆ,y0∈Yˆ0
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, T )− y?
z ≥ y? − min
δ∈Dˆ,y0∈Yˆ0
y(xb, xr, δ, y0, T )
=

min
z
p?z
s.t. z ≥ max
δ∈DˆK,y0∈Yˆ0
yK(x
b,xr, δ, y0)− y?
z ≥ y? − min
δ∈DˆK,y0∈Yˆ0
yK(x
b,xr, δ, y0)
= max
δ∈DˆK,y0∈Yˆ0
p?|yK(xb,xr, δ, y0)− y?|.
(21)
Here, the second equality follows from Propositions 6 and 7, which apply because Dˆ and DˆK have
the same structures as D and DK, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 1. The claim follows immediately from Propositions 5–8.
Even though the infinite-dimensional non-convex robust optimization problem (R) admits a
lossless time discretization, its discrete-time counterpart (RK) still constitutes a non-convex robust
optimization problem and thus appears to be hard. In the next section, however, we will show
that (R) can be reformulated as a tractable linear program by exploiting its structural properties.
4 Linear Programming Reformulation
In order to establish the tractability of the non-convex robust optimization problem (R), it is useful
to reformulate its time discretization (RK) as the following linear robust optimization problem,
where all constraint functions are bilinear in the decision variables and the uncertain parameters.
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min
xb,xr∈XK,
m∈RK ,z∈R
cK(xb,xr) + p?z
s.t. xrk + x
b
k ≤ y¯+k , xrk − xbk ≤ y¯−k ∀k ∈ K
mk − η+xrk ≥ 0, mk −
1
η−
xrk + ∆η x
b
k ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K
y¯0 + ∆t
k∑
l=1
η+
(
xbl + δlx
r
l
)− dl ≤ y¯ ∀δ ∈ D+K , ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}
¯
y0 + ∆t
k∑
l=1
η+xbl −mlδl − dl ≥
¯
y ∀δ ∈ D+K , ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}
ˆ¯y0 − z + ∆t
K∑
k=1
η+
(
xbk + δkx
r
k
)− dk ≤ y? ∀δ ∈ Dˆ+K
ˆ
¯
y
0
+ z + ∆t
K∑
k=1
η+xbk −mkδk − dk ≥ y? ∀δ ∈ Dˆ+K
(R′K)
Here, ∆η = 1
η− − η+ ≥ 0 is used as a shorthand for the reduction in the battery state-of-charge
resulting from first charging and then again discharging one unit of energy as seen from the grid.
Theorem 2 (Lossless linearization). The problems (RK) and (R′K) are equivalent.
Proof. By introducing embedded optimization problems that evaluate the (decision-dependent)
worst-case frequency deviation scenarios and by replacing the uncertain initial state-of-charge in
each robust constraint with its (decision-independent) worst-case value, (RK) can be recast as
min
xb,xr∈XK,z∈R
cK(xb,xr) + p?z
s.t. max
δ∈DK
y+(xbk, x
r
k, δk) ≤ y¯+k ∀k ∈ K (a)
max
δ∈DK
y−(xbk, x
r
k, δk) ≤ y¯−k ∀k ∈ K (b)
max
δ∈DK
yk(x
b,xr, δ, y¯0) ≤ y¯ ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0} (c)
min
δ∈DK
yk(x
b,xr, δ,
¯
y0) ≥
¯
y ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0} (d)
max
δ∈DˆK
yK(x
b,xr, δ, ˆ¯y0)− z ≤ y? (e)
min
δ∈DˆK
yK(x
b,xr, δ, ˆ
¯
y
0
) + z ≥ y?. (f)
(22)
Here, the worst-case deviation of the terminal state-of-charge from its target value has been moved
from the objective function to the constraints by introducing the auxiliary epigraphical variable z.
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To show that (22) is equivalent to (R′K), we reuse several results derived for the proof of Theorem 1.
First, by Equation (7) in the proof of Proposition 5 the maximum charging power in (22a) equals
max
δ∈DK
y+(xbk, x
r
k, δk) = x
r
k + x
b
k.
Using similar arguments, it can be shown that the maximum discharging power in (22b) reduces to
max
δ∈DK
y−(xbk, x
r
k, δk) = x
r
k − xbk.
Next, Equation (9) in the proof of Proposition 6 reveals that, for any k ∈ K ∪ {0}, the maximum
state-of-charge in (22c) is given by
max
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ, y¯0
)
= y¯0 + max
δ∈D+K
∆t
k∑
l=1
η+
(
xbl + δlx
r
l
)
− dl.
Similarly, Equation (17) in the proof of Proposition 7 implies that, for every k ∈ K ∪ {0}, the
minimum state-of-charge in (22d) amounts to
min
δ∈DK
yk
(
xb,xr, δ,
¯
y0
)
=
¯
y0 + min
δ∈D+K
∆t
k∑
l=1
η+xbl −mlδl − dl,
where ml = max{η+xrl , 1η−xrl −∆η xbl} constitutes an implicit function of the market decisions xbl
and xrl . As (22d) imposes a lower bound on the minimum state-of-charge, ml may be reinterpreted
as an auxiliary epigraphical variable that satisfies ml ≥ η+xrl and ml ≥ 1η−xrl −∆η xbl .
As DK and DˆK have the same structure, the embedded optimization problems in (22e) and (22f)
admit similar reformulations. Substituting all obtained reformulations into (22) yields (R′K).
The linear robust optimization problem (R′K) still appears to be difficult because each robust con-
straint must hold for all frequency deviation scenarios in an uncountable uncertainty set D+K or Dˆ+K
and therefore corresponds to a continuum of ordinary linear constraints. Fortunately, standard
robust optimization theory (Ben-Tal et al., 2004; Bertsimas and Sim, 2004) allows us to reformu-
late (R′K) as the tractable linear program
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min cK(xb,xr) + p?z
s.t. xb,xr ∈ XK, m ∈ RK , z ∈ R, λ+,λ−,θ+,θ− ∈ RK+ ,Λ+,Λ−,Θ+,Θ− ∈ RK×K+
xrk + x
b
k ≤ y¯+k , xrk − xbk ≤ y¯−k ∀k ∈ K
mk ≥ η+xrk, mk ≥
1
η−
xrk −∆η xbk ∀k ∈ K
k∑
l=1
∆t
(
η+xbl + Λ
+
k,l − dl
)
+ γΘ+k,l ≤ y¯ − y¯0 ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}
k∑
l=1
∆t
(
η+xbl − Λ−k,l − dl
)
− γΘ−k,l ≥
¯
y −
¯
y0 ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}∑
k∈K
∆t
(
η+xbk + λ
+
k − dk
)
+ γˆθ+k ≤ y? − ˆ¯y0 + z∑
k∈K
∆t
(
η+xbk − λ−k − dk
)
− γˆθ−k ≥ y? − ˆ
¯
y
0
− z
Λ+k,l +
I(k,l)∑
i=l
Θ+k,i ≥ η+xrl , Λ−k,l +
I(k,l)∑
i=l
Θ−k,i ≥ ml ∀k, l ∈ K : l ≤ k
λ+k +
Iˆ(K,k)∑
i=k
θ+i ≥ η+xrk, λ−k +
Iˆ(K,k)∑
i=k
θ−i ≥ mk ∀k ∈ K,
(R′′K)
where I(k, l) = min{k, l + Γ/∆t− 1} and Iˆ(k, l) = min{k, l + Γˆ/∆t− 1}.
Theorem 3 (Linear programming reformulation). The problems (R′K) and (R
′′
K) are equivalent.
Proof. Problem (R′K) can be reformulated as a linear program by using the standard machinery of
robust optimization (Bertsimas and Sim, 2004; Ben-Tal et al., 2009). For example, the robust upper
bound on the state-of-charge for a fixed k ∈ K ∪ {0} is equivalent to
y¯0 +∆t
k∑
l=1
η+
(
xbl + δlx
r
l
)
−dl ≤ y¯ ∀δ ∈ D+K ⇐⇒ max
δ∈D+K
∆t
k∑
l=1
η+
(
xbl + δlx
r
l
)
−dl ≤ y¯− y¯0. (23)
By strong linear programming duality, the maximization problem in (23) is equivalent to
min
Λ+,Θ+∈RK×K+
k∑
l=1
∆t
(
η+xbl + Λ
+
k,l − dl
)
+ γΘ+k,l
s.t. Λ+k,l +
j(k,l)∑
i=l
Θ+k,i ≥ η+xrl ∀l ∈ K : l ≤ k,
(24)
and the minimum of (24) is smaller or equal to y¯ − y¯0 if and only if problem (24) has a feasible
solution whose objective value is smaller or equal to y¯ − y¯0. Therefore, the robust constraint (23)
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is equivalent to the following system of ordinary linear constraints.
k∑
l=1
∆t
(
η+xbl + Λ
+
k,l − dl
)
+ γΘ+k,l ≤ y¯ − y¯0
Λ+k,l +
I(k,l)∑
i=l
Θ+k,i ≥ η+xrl ∀l ∈ K : l ≤ k
The remaining robust constraints in (R′K) can be simplified in a similar manner.
The conversion of the robust optimization problem (R′K) to the linear program (R
′′
K) comes at
the expense of introducing 4K2 + 4K dual variables. For a daily planning horizon with half-hourly
resolution, this amounts to introducing 9,408 additional continuous variables. Overall, the linear
program (R′′K) involves 4K
2 + 7K + 1 variables and 5K2 + 15K + 4 constraints, that is, its size
scales quadratically with K. In conjunction, Theorems 1–3 imply that the infinite-dimensional
non-convex robust optimization problem (R) can be reduced without any loss to the tractable
linear program (R′′K), which is amenable to efficient numerical solution with state-of-the-art linear
programming solvers such as CPLEX or Gurobi.
5 Numerical Experiments
In the following, we first describe how the vehicle owner’s decision problem is parametrized from
data, and we explain the backtesting procedure that is used to assess the performance of a given
bidding strategy. Next, we present numerical results and discuss policy implications. All experi-
ments are run on an Intel i7-6700 CPU with 3.40GHz clock speed and 64GB of RAM. All linear
programs are solved with GUROBI 9.0 using its PYTHON interface. In order to ensure the re-
producibility of our experiments, we provide links to all data sources and make our code available
at www.github.com/lauinger/reliable-frequency-regulation-through-vehicle-to-grid.
5.1 Model Parametrization
The French transmission system operator (RTE) publishes availability and delivery prices and fre-
quency measurements.4 There have been two policy changes in frequency regulation since 2015.
While the availability prices were historically kept constant throughout the year, they change on
4http://clients.rte-france.com/
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a weekly basis since mid-January 2017 and on a daily basis since July 2019. At this point, the
pricing mechanism also changed from a pay-as-bid auction to a clearing price auction. The average
availability price over all years from 2015 to 2019 amounts to 0.8cts/kWh, but the yearly average
decreased in 2017 and 2018, and increased again in 2019 to pre-2017 levels. For all practical pur-
poses we may assume that the expected regulation price pr(t) coincides with the availability price
pa(t) because the frequency deviations have approximately zero mean and are largely independent
of the delivery prices. This allows us to set E[δ˜(t)p˜d(t)] to zero for all t ∈ T . Figure 7 in Ap-
pendix A shows indeed that the realized regulation price pa(t) + δ(t)pd(t) oscillates rapidly around
the availability price pa(t) due to intra-day fluctuations of the frequency-adjusted delivery prices.
We further identify the utility prices pb(t) with the residential electricity prices charged by Electricité
de France (EDF), the largest European electricity provider. These prices exhibit six different levels
corresponding to peak- and off-peak hours on high, medium and low price days. High price days
can occur exclusively on work days between November and March, whereas medium price days can
occur on all days except Sundays. Low-price days can occur year-round. The peak hours are defined
as the hours from 6 am to 10 pm on work days, and all the other hours are designated as off-peak
hours. The prices corresponding to each type of day and hour are regulated and published in the
official French government bulletin.5 Over the past five years, these prices have not changed more
than three times per year. On each day, RTE announces the next day’s price levels by 10:30 am.
The average utility price over the years from 2015 to 2019 amounts to 14cts/kWh and thus exceeds
the average availability price by two orders of magnitude.
When simulating the impact of the market decisions on the battery state-of-charge, it is impor-
tant to track the frequency signal with a high time resolution. In fact, the European Commission
(2017) requires regulation providers to adjust the power flow between the battery and the grid every
ten seconds in order to ensure that it closely matches xb(t) + δ(t)xr(t) for all t ∈ T . This means
that regulation providers need to measure the frequency deviation δ(t) at least every ten seconds.
Hence, we use a sampling rate of 0.1Hz when simulating the impact of the market decisions on
the battery state-of-charge. This contrasts with previous studies, which used sampling rates be-
low 20mHz (Han et al., 2010; Sortomme and El-Sharkawi, 2012; Donadee and Ilić, 2014; Wu and
Sioshansi, 2019). Recall from Section 2 that the frequency deviation δ(t) depends on the nominal
5Journal Officiel de la République Française: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
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grid frequency f0 = 50Hz and on the normalization constant ∆f = 200mHz. Moreover, recall that
the uncertainty set D is parametrized by γ = 0.5h and Γ = 2.5h in order to respect the delivery
guarantee rules prescribed by the European Commission, while the less conservative uncertainty
set Dˆ is parametrized by γˆ = 0.5h and Γˆ = 24h as described in the discussion of Figure 1.
The vehicle data is summarized in Table 2 in Appendix A. The chosen parameter values are rep-
resentative for commercially available midrange vehicle-to-grid-capable electric vehicles such as the
2018 Nissan Leaf, and they are in line with experimental measurements of charging and discharg-
ing efficiencies. For example, Apostolaki-Iosifidou et al. (2017) find that charging and discharging
efficiencies η+ and η−, respectively, vary between 64% and 88% for a LiPF6 cobalt battery with a
nominal voltage of 345V and a nominal capacity of 106Ah. We assume that, with the exception of
public holidays, the vehicle owner reserves the time windows from 7 am to 9 am and from 5 pm
to 7 pm on work days and from 10 am to 12 midday on Saturdays for driving. At all other times,
the car is connected to a bidirectional charging station. We assume that the car’s yearly mileage
amounts to 10,000km, which approximately matches the French average of 13,000km (Commissariat
général au développement durable, 2010). Hence, the car travels about 30km per day on average.
Usually, this distance can be easily covered within one hour. Nevertheless, it makes sense to reserve
up to four hours for driving on work days because the vehicle owner may not know a day in ad-
vance at what exact time she will drive to work and back home. With a standard vehicle efficiency
of 0.2kWh/km, the car thus consumes 2, 000kWh per year.
5.2 Backtesting Procedure
In our experiments, we assess the performance of different bidding strategies over different test
datasets covering one of the years between 2015 and 2019. A bidding strategy is any procedure that
computes on each day at noon a pair of market decisions xb and xr for the following day. We call a
strategy non-anticipative if it determines the market decisions using only information observed in
the past. In addition, we call a strategy feasible if it allows the vehicle owner to honor all market
commitments for all frequency deviation scenarios within the uncertainty set D.
To measure the profit generated by a particular strategy over one year of test data, we use the
following backtesting procedure. On each day at noon we compute the market decisions for the
following day. We then use the actual frequency deviation data between noon and midnight and
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the market decisions for the current day to calculate the true battery state-of-charge at midnight.
Next, we use the frequency deviation data of the following day to calculate the revenue from selling
regulation power to the TSO, which is subtracted from the cost of buying electricity for charging
the battery. If the strategy is infeasible and the vehicle owner is not able to deliver all promised
regulation power even though the realized frequency deviation trajectory falls within the uncertainty
set D, then she pays a penalty for first-time offenses and is excluded from the regulation market for
repeated offenses. Regulation power that cannot be delivered or consumed at time t is penalized
at a kpen-fold multiple of the availability price pa(t), where the penalty factor kpen depends on the
TSO and ranges from 3 to 10.6 In each experiment we either assume that the vehicle owner pays a
penalty corresponding to a fixed value of kpen for every offense or is excluded from the regulation
market directly after the first offense. Similarly, if the battery is empty at a time t when the vehicle
should drive, then we assume that the missing power can be bought instantly at a high price py,
which reflects the money the vehicle owner would need to expend to either recharge the battery at
a public fast charging station (in which case we set7 py = 0.75e /kWh) or to use another means
of transportation such as a ride-hailing service (in which case we set8 py = 7.50e /kWh). The
procedure described above is repeated on each day, and the resulting daily profits are accumulated
over the entire test dataset.
Our baseline strategy is to determine the next day’s market decisions by solving the robust
optimization problem (R), which is equivalent to the linear program (R′′K). This problem must be
updated on each day because the market prices pb and pr change and because the uncertainty sets
Y0 and Yˆ0 for the state-of-charge at midnight depend on the state-of-charge at noon as well as on
the market commitments between noon and midnight that were agreed upon one day earlier. Note
also that the baseline strategy is feasible thanks to the robust constraints in (R), which ensure that
the vehicle owner can provide regulation power for all frequency deviation scenarios in D.
The parameters p? and y? are kept constant throughout each backtest. Specifically, we set
p? = 1+k20 for some k = 1, . . . , 5 and y
? = 12 +
l
30 for some l = 0, . . . , 5. Every tuple (p
?, y?) encodes a
different bidding strategy. Given a training dataset comprising one year of frequency measurements
and market prices, we compute the cumulative profit of each strategy via the backtesting procedure
6For example Réseau de transport d’électricité (2017a) sets kpen = 5.
7In line with the prices charged by the European fast charging network Ionity (https://ionity.eu/en/).
8Uber charges about 1.50e /km for a trip in Paris (https://www.uber.com/us/en/price-estimate/).
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Table 1. Calibration of p? and y?
Test Anticipative Calibration Non-Anticipative Calibration Regret
Dataset p? (e /kWh)
y?−
¯
y
y¯−
¯
y (%) Profit (e ) p
? (e /kWh)
y?−
¯
y
y¯−
¯
y (%) Profit (e ) (%)
2015 0.10 100 −95 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2016 0.15 56.7 −125 0.10 100 −138 10
2017 −174 0.15 56.7 −174 0
2018 −184 −184
2019 0.15 56.7 −160 0.15 56.7 −160 0
outlined above, and we choose the tuple (p?, y?) that corresponds to the winning strategy. This
strategy is non-anticipative if the year of the training dataset precedes the year of the test dataset.
Table 1 shows that selecting p? and y? non-anticipatively on a historical training dataset has low
regret relative to selecting these parameters anticipatively on the test dataset. Here, the regret is
defined as the ratio of the absolute difference and the arithmetic mean of the cumulative profits
generated by the anticipative and the non-anticipative strategies tuned on the test and training
datasets, respectively. We always use the year immediately prior to the test dataset as training
dataset. Table 1 shows that from 2017 onward, perhaps surprisingly, anticipative parameter tuning
has no advantage over non-anticipative tuning. From now on, we assume that p? and y? are tuned
non-anticipatively using the year of training data immediately prior to the test dataset. Additional
robustness checks reveal that the cumulative profit (evaluated on 2019 data) is relatively insensitive
to the choice of p? and y? within the suggested search grid, which indicates that its resolution is
sufficiently high. Details are omitted for the sake of brevity.
5.3 Experiments: Set-up, Results and Discussion
We define the value of vehicle-to-grid as the cumulative excess profit of the normal baseline strategy
with respect to a simplified variant of the baseline strategy that does not participate in the reserve
market. This simplified strategy solves problem (R) under the additional constraint xr = 0.
In the remainder, we distinguish six different simulation scenarios. The nominal scenario uses the
parameters of Table 2 in Appendix A for both training and testing. All other scenarios are based on
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Figure 2. Value of vehicle-to-grid in 2019 in different simulation scenarios.
slightly modified parameters. Specifically, we consider a lossless energy conversion scenario, which
trains and tests the baseline strategy under the assumption that η+ = η− = 1. A variant of this
scenario assumes lossless energy conversion in training but tests the resulting strategy under the
nominal values of η+ and η−. We also consider two scenarios with weaker robustness guarantees
that replace the uncertainty set D in the training phase with its subset Dˆ. The resulting bidding
strategy can be infeasible because it may fail to provide the legally required amount of reserve
power. The two scenarios do not differ in training but impose different sanctions for infeasibilities
in testing. In the first of the two scenarios the vehicle owner is immediately excluded from the
reserve market upon the first infeasibility, thus loosing the opportunity to earn money by offering
grid services for the rest of the year. In the second scenario, on the other hand, the vehicle owner
incurs a penalty of kpen ·pa(t), kpen = 5, or py = 7.50e /kWh for energy that is missing for frequency
regulation or driving at time t, respectively. Finally, we consider a scenario in which the vehicle is
only equipped with a unidirectional charger, that is, we set y¯− = 0. Thus, the vehicle is unable to
feed power back into the grid. Requests for up-regulation (δ(t) < 0) can therefore only be satisfied
by consuming less energy, which is possible only if δ(t)xr(t) ≤ xb(t).
Figure 2 visualizes the value of vehicle-to-grid in 2019 as a function of time for each of the six
simulation scenarios. We first observe that the value of vehicle-to-grid in the lossless energy conver-
sion scenario amounts to 160e at the end of the year and thus significantly exceeds the respective
value of 130e in the nominal scenario. Using a perfectly efficient vehicle charger would thus have
boosted the value of vehicle-to-grid by 23% in 2019. This is not surprising because a perfect charger
prevents costly energy conversion losses. Note also that the scenario with misspecified efficiency pa-
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Figure 3. Value of vehicle-to-grid in 2019 for different penalty parameters.
rameters results in almost the same value of vehicle-to-grid as the nominal scenario, which suggests
that misrepresenting η+ or η− in training has a negligible effect on the test performance. However,
the underlying bidding strategy is not guaranteed to be feasible because it neglects energy conver-
sion losses. Even though this strategy happens to remain feasible throughout 2019, it bears the
risk of financial penalties or market exclusion. The two bidding strategies with weakened robust-
ness guarantees initially reap high profits by aggressively participating in the reserve market, but
they already fail in the first half of January to fulfill all market commitments. If infeasibilities are
sanctioned by market exclusion, the cumulative excess profit thus remains flat after this incident.
If infeasibilities lead to financial penalties, on the other hand, the cumulative excess profit drops
sharply below zero near the incident but recovers quickly and then continues to grow steadily. As
only a few other mild infeasibilities occur in 2019, the end-of-year excess profit of this aggressive
bidding strategy still piles up to 325e , which exceeds the excess profit in the nominal scenario by
a factor of 2.5. We conclude that the current level of financial penalties may be too low to deter
vehicle owners from making promises they cannot honor. Finally, with a unidirectional charger,
the 2019 value of vehicle-to-grid falls to 14e , which is only 11% of the respective value with a
bidirectional charger.
As the bidding strategy with a weakened robustness guarantee can earn high profits when
infringements of the EU delivery guarantee incur only financial penalties, we carry out an additional
experiment to analyze the impact of the penalty parameters kpen and py on the value of vehicle-
to-grid. Figure 3 shows that for py = 0.75e /kWh doubling the penalty factor kpen from 5 to 10
decreases the value of vehicle-to-grid by 5% from 360e to 340e . Additional tests suggest that the
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Figure 4. Value of vehicle-to-grid from 2016 to 2019.
TSO would have to raise kpen to 65 in order to incentivize the vehicle owner to fulfill the EU delivery
guarantee. On the other hand, a tenfold increase of the reserve price py to 7.50e /kWh decreases
the value of vehicle-to-grid by 10% to 325e . Note that py is beyond the control of the TSO.
While the statistics of the frequency recordings remain stationary over time, the market prices
are subject to seasonal changes. To assess the impact of these changes, we compute the value of
vehicle-to-grid for each year between 2016 and 2019. Figure 4 shows that the end-of-year value of
vehicle-to-grid first dropped from 115e in 2016 to 85e in 2018 and then climbed up again to 130e in
2019. This trend reversal is partly explained by the spikes in the availability and regulation prices in
January 2019, see, e.g., Figure 7 in Appendix A. In France, such spikes can occur during cold winters
when nuclear power plants lack cooling water due to low river levels and must thus shut down.9
It may seem questionable whether a yearly profit of 85e to 130e is high enough to (i) justify the
investment into a bidirectional charger, (ii) convince vehicle owners to make their battery available
to the power grid, and to (iii) incentivize companies to develop and commercialize vehicle-to-grid
technologies. However, in a recent survey Geske and Schumann (2018) find that even modest profits
may incentivize German electric vehicle owners to engage in vehicle-to-grid. Furthermore, in a future
with more intermittent renewable energy and a lower number of controllable thermal power plants,
batteries might be one of the few technologies capable of providing frequency regulation. Thus,
regulation prices and the value of vehicle-to-grid may rise in the future. On the other hand, increased
competition from new market entrants operating stationary second life batteries (Martinez-Laserna
9The sharp decline in nuclear generation at the beginning of January 2019 is evident in RTE’s generation dataset
accessible from https://opendata.reseaux-energies.fr/explore/dataset/production-quotidienne-filiere/.
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et al., 2018) could counteract a price increase.
In the next experiment we investigate how the value of vehicle-to-grid depends on the activation
ratio γ/Γ, the charger power and the battery size. Recall that the activation ratio can be intuitively
understood as the minimum amount of time during which the regulation provider must be able
to deliver all the promised regulation power. Figure 5 suggests that, all else being equal, the
value of vehicle-to-grid is concave non-decreasing in the charger power y¯+ = y¯− and the effective
battery size y¯ −
¯
y, and convex non-increasing in the activation ratio γ/Γ. Such a behavior is to
be expected because increasing the charger power or the battery size relaxes the constraints of the
linear program (R′′K), whereas increasing γ/Γ tightens the constraints. The value of vehicle-to-grid
increases with the charger power up to a saturation point that itself increases with the effective
battery size and decreases with the activation ratio. This insight may inform manufacturers about
the optimal design of vehicle chargers and batteries for primary frequency regulation. We define the
reserve time as the ratio of the effective battery capacity to the charger power at the saturation point.
It quantifies the time needed to discharge the initially full battery. For an activation ratio of 1/5 we
find a reserve time of 60kWh/6kW = 10h, whereas for an activation ratio of 1/10 the reserve time
decreases to 30kWh/6kW = 5h. Recalling the European Commission (2017) legislation, whereby
the “minimum activation period [should be no] greater than 30 or smaller than 15 minutes”, the
activation ratio γ/Γ should indeed be between 1/10 and 1/5. Our results show that setting γ/Γ
equal to 1/10 rather than 1/5 increases the value of vehicle-to-grid at the saturation point by 85%
for a fixed battery size. A reserve time between 5 and 10 hours is aligned with current electric vehicle
charger and battery dimensions. Previous studies (Kempton and Tomić, 2005; Codani et al., 2015;
Borne, 2019) advocate reserve times of only 1, 2.2 and 2.7 hours, respectively, to maximize the
value of vehicle-to-grid for primary frequency regulation. These values are 2 to 4 times smaller
than the reserve times calculated with our approach. As we use similar vehicle parameters and
price data as Borne (2019), this discrepancy can only be explained by methodological differences.
Indeed, our robust optimization approach is guaranteed to yield a non-anticipative and feasible
bidding strategy. In contrast, Borne (2019) allows the vehicle owner to anticipate future frequency
deviations. Similarly, Codani et al. (2015) assume that the bidding strategy can be updated on an
hourly basis, thus exploiting online information that is not available at the time when the market
bids are collected by the TSO (i.e., one day in advance). Based on these anticipative strategies, the
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Figure 5. The value of vehicle-to-grid increases with the charger power y¯+ = y¯− up to
a saturation point that increases with the effective battery capacity y¯ − y and decreases
with the activation ratio γ/Γ.
value of vehicle-to-grid is estimated at about 400e for a vehicle with a 3kW charger at home and a
7kW charger at work. We find similar values if we reduce the activation ratio from γ/Γ to γˆ/Γˆ and
assume that the non-delivery of promised reserve power results in a financial penalty rather than
market exclusion.
In general, the higher the activation ratio, the higher the reserve time and the lower the charger
power for a given battery size. While the charger power of electric vehicles can be adjusted relatively
easily to match the reserve time for frequency regulation, the same does not hold for pumped-storage
hydro power plants, the incumbent storage providers of the European electricity grid. Their reservoir
sizes are dictated by geography and their charging and discharging rates by the numbers and sizes
of water conduits. Obtaining the necessary permits to change either of the two may require decades.
Therefore, the incumbent storage operators have an incentive to lobby for market rules that are
compatible with their current plants. For example, the three largest French pumped hydro power
plants all have a storage time ranging from 20 hours to one week. To minimize competition from
vehicle-to-grid, it may be in their interest to lobby for high activation ratios. From the perspective
of a TSO, the higher the activation ratio, the larger the uncertainty set D and the lower the
probability of blackouts. However, Figure 1 suggests that an activation period of 30 min is already
conservative. On the other hand, the larger D, the harder it is for storage operators to provide
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Figure 6. Value of vehicle-to-grid versus mileage for a a uni- and a bidirectional charger.
regulation power, which may lead to less competition, higher market prices and a higher total cost
of frequency regulation. As the system operator is a public entity, this cost is ultimately borne by
the public. In the end, the choice of the activation ratio is a political decision.
The last experiment compares two vehicles with uni- and bidirectional chargers. Figure 6 in-
dicates that the value of vehicle-to-grid is concave in the yearly mileage for both vehicles and for
mileages up to 40,000km. Since a vehicle with a bidirectional charger can be used for unidirec-
tional charging, the value of vehicle-to-grid with a bidirectional charger exceeds that of the same
vehicle with a unidirectional charger. Furthermore, a higher mileage necessitates higher utility pur-
chases xb, which has two opposing effects on regulation profits. On the one hand, power discharges
become less likely because they only occur when δ(t)xr(t) > xb(t), which reduces energy conversion
losses and makes the provision of frequency regulation more cost-effective. On the other hand, the
effective upper bound y¯+(t)−xb(t) on xr(t) tightens, which reduces the amount of regulation power
that can be offered on the market. The value of vehicle-to-grid peaks at 130e for a vehicle with a
bidirectional charger traveling 104km per year and at 30e for a vehicle with a unidirectional charger
traveling 3 · 104km per year. The higher the yearly mileage, the lower the added value of a bidi-
rectional charger. This result may be of particular interest for operators of shared electric vehicles.
However, even for a yearly mileage of 3 · 104km, using a bidirectional instead of a unidirectional
charger more than doubles the value of vehicle-to-grid. Furthermore, many drivers may prefer vehi-
cles with internal combustion engines or fuel cells over electric vehicles to cover high yearly mileages
because of their greater ranges and shorter refueling times. Therefore, owners of electric vehicle
are more likely to cover yearly mileages close to the French average of 1.3 · 104km rather than the
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3 · 104km that are optimal for unidirectional vehicle-to-grid. Hence, providing frequency regulation
with a unidirectional charger would earn them less than 20e per year. In practice, these earnings
would have to be shared with vehicle aggregators and equipment manufacturers.
6 Conclusions
Vehicle-to-grid has the potential to offer vast amounts of flexibility to the electricity grid. The
exploitation of this potential depends on its profitability. We show that the recent legislation by the
European Commission for primary frequency regulation has a significant impact on the profitability
of vehicle-to-grid. In particular, we use robust optimization techniques to analyze the ramifications
of the reliability guarantee defined by the European Commission. In our case study, the profitability
of vehicle-to-grid increases by 85% if the reliability guarantee decreases by half. This guarantee is
the result of a political negotiation that balances the protection of the electricity system with the
costs of that protection. Like all political processes, it is subject to lobbying. In the case of primary
frequency regulation, the interests of incumbent flexibility providers, such as hydro power stations,
diverge somewhat from those of new market entrants engaging in vehicle-to-grid. Whatever the
outcome of the political process, it will only be respected if there are penalties that incentivize all
stakeholders to comply with the rules. Our results suggest that this is not the case at the moment.
This endangers the operational safety of electricity networks because it gives system operators a
false sense of security. It is entirely conceivable, for example, that several providers fail to deliver
their promised regulation power simultaneously when faced with a black swan event.
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A Problem Data and Model Parameters
Table 2. Parameters of the Nominal Simulation Scenario
Parameter Symbol Value Unit
Vehicle Data
Minimum State-of-Charge
¯
y 10 kWh
Maximum State-of-Charge y¯ 40 kWh
Target State-of-Charge y? 27 kWh
Deviation Penalty p? 0.15 e /kWh
Charging Efficiency η+ 85 %
Discharging Efficiency η− 85 %
Maximum Charing Power y¯+ 7 kW
Maximum Discharging Power y¯− 7 kW
Yearly Energy for Driving 2,000 kWh
Fraction of Time Driving 13 %
Grid Data
Nominal frequency f0 50 Hz
Normalization constant ∆f 200 mHz
Average Utility Price from 2015 to 2019 14.31 cts/kWh
Average Availability Price from 2015 to 2019 8.25 cts/kW/h
General Parameters
Trading Interval ∆t 30 min
Activation Period in D γ 30 min
Regulation Cycle in D Γ 2.5 h
Activation Period in Dˆ γˆ 30 min
Regulation Cycle in Dˆ Γˆ 1 day
Sampling Rate for Frequency Measurements 0.1 Hz
Planning Horizon T 1 day
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Figure 7. Evolution of the availability and regulation prices from 2015 to 2019. The
regulation price changes every 10s. For better visibility, we show its daily averages.
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